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# Deceit

By Lawrence McNabb

## at Pearl Harbor

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One of the most compelling indictments of the Roosevelt administration can be found on page 278 of A. Ralph Epperson's, *The Unseen Hand*. In his book he recounts the following story as follows. "The American Ambassador to Tokyo, Joseph C. Grew, was one of the first to officially discover that Pearl Harbor was the intended target of the Japanese attack, as he corresponded with President Roosevelt's State Department on January 27, 1941: 'The Peruvian minister has informed a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that, in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intended to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor. Apparently, Joseph Grew reported his information to Washington on two separate occasions in 1941, indicating that the Japanese intended to make a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. In addition, we now know that a Russian spy, Dr. Richard Sorge, stationed in Japan, informed the Kremlin and Stalin in October 1941 of the Japanese intent and proposed plan to attack Pearl Harbor within 60 days should negotiations with the United States fail. At this point, in time we know that Roosevelt and Stalin were exchanging any and all vital information and it was obviously in Stalin's best interest to have president Roosevelt behold to him for any information he might have.

During this same general period of time, Congressman Martin Dies, then Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, provided president Roosevelt with a large amount of information confirming suspicions that the Japanese were studying the possibility of not only an attack but an invasion of Pearl Harbor. The Dies committee had evidence that the Japanese were assembling much vital military information about Pearl Harbor. This and much more is available in the congressional record.

The most damning information, however, comes directly from the few "Magic Machine" transcripts that the United States Government has released from among the many thousands they intercepted. The Japanese Purple military code was broken many months before the attack. The final messages,

directing all diplomatic and consular posts to destroy codes and ciphers and to burn all confidential and secret material were a dead give away of impending military action on the part of the Japanese, so obvious that even a novice could figure out that all U.S. military installations should be put on high alert.

Amazingly, this important information was never given to the American military command in Hawaii by those in Washington D.C. with the express responsibility to do so. The irony of Admiral Kimmel's predicament was that the very information which the Roosevelt administration was denying its Commander-in-Chief of the American Pacific Fleet was simultaneously being given to the British all through 1941.

From early July until the attack on December 7, 1941, "Magic machines" in Washington intercepted up to 130 messages a day, which were then rushed in locked briefcases by special messengers to Roosevelt and his chief advisers, who scanned them without taking any notes while the messenger stood by; and then all copies but one were returned and burned. All secret coded intercepts went to only nine (9) persons, according to the testimony of General Miles. Whether it was 9 or 14, he still named President Roosevelt, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of Navy Knox Secretary of State Hull, Chief of Staff Marshall, Chief of Naval Operations Stark, General Crew, Colonel Bratton and himself. Despite the obvious conclusion to be drawn from the nature of these secret Japanese communications requesting precise ship locations on a daily basis, not one word was ever given to Hawaiian Army or Navy Field Commanders. The messages from Tokyo to their spies in Hawaii were monitored daily and given to Washington. When they were decoded, such information as to what ships were in Pearl Harbor, whether balloons were flying overhead, and whether anti-mine nets, were provided, was being requested. Even an extremely naive non-military person could guess what was about to happen.

Naval Intelligence officer Arthur H. McCollum had decoded information about Pearl Harbor. He wanted to send a warning, to Hawaii, but his request was denied by Admiral Stark. The Army couldn't reach General Marshall at this vital time, and it was later reported that he was away from his office horse-back riding. Admiral Stark was later advised by Secretary of Navy Forrestal, that he could no longer hold a command of importance! At later hearings, Admiral Stark and General Marshall could not recall what they did that day of December 7, 1941! Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in confidence with his friend Joe Lieb during discussion at a public park in Washington, D.C., explained that Pearl Harbor would be the target of attack December 7, 1941. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover told congressman Bender of Ohio that there had been warnings that a Pearl Harbor bombing was a possibility; and he also told Roosevelt about these warnings. Hoover said Roosevelt's reply was that it must not be mentioned and that he would take care of it.

On December 6, 1941, at 6:30 PM, with the Japanese Fleet close to attack position, Japanese spies became so brazen that they actually requested and delivered updated information on open telephone lines; and even more amazingly, all their conversations were monitored and recorded by the FBI. The following three Japanese messages were intercepted and reported; yet, none of this information would ever reach Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii. It can only be concluded that the following messages were deliberately suppressed.

(1) Without any knowledge of the "Magic Machines" and using standard surveillance equipment at the U.S. Naval Intelligence office located at 717 Market street, San Francisco, California, Lieutenant Ellsworth Holsman and his assistant, Robert Ogg, received and plotted the location of Japanese signals from the North Pacific area. They noted signals coming from north of the Hawaiian Islands and plotted them for four (4) days. Each day they were plotted closer to Hawaii until they were only about 500 miles away. This information was consistently reported to the Commander of the 12th Naval District, Captain McCullough. (It is now known that he happened to be a close friend of President Roosevelt.) It can only be assumed that Holsman and others found it prudent not to concern themselves with why this critical information was not provided to Hawaii. (Details of this odious event were published in the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association publication Gram of July 1987.)

(2) Passenger ship Lurline was about 3 days from Honolulu when it's Radio-man, a Mr. Hauser, began picking up coded Japanese messages, and he recorded some of them. Upon arrival, the messages were immediately taken to Naval Intelligence at the Alexander Young Building. It is sad that they were not taken to either Admiral Kimmel or General Short, alerting them of Japanese naval locations and potential air attack, allowing them to take defensive measures.

(3) In their book, Betrayal of Pearl Harbor by James Rusbridger and Eric Nave it is reported that, during 1941 alone, over 16,000 Japanese messages were intercepted. Eric Nave was known, as the father of British code-breakers in the

far East; and he was one of the British Naval officers who helped to break some of the Japanese naval codes prior to WWII with the JN-25 decoder, rendering his knowledge and experience beyond reproach when writing on this critical subject. While the attack fleet of Admiral Yamamoto was steaming toward Hawaii between November 20, and December 7, 1941 both British and American code-breakers were busy intercepting and decoding all of the Japanese messages. At least twenty of them are in existence today in the U.S. National Archives, as reported in their book.

We know further that it was the interception of Japanese military Purple Code communications regarding the location of Admiral Yamamoto's personal plane which enabled WWII ace Thomas Lanphier Jr. to shoot down Admiral Yamamoto over Rabaul. Yamamoto's death was very convenient for Roosevelt, since public knowledge of Admiral Yamamoto's efforts to avoid conflict with America, his opposition to instituting the very plan he had devised, and Roosevelt administration's rejection of his appeal, would have proven embarrassing to the Roosevelt legacy.

In John T. Flynn's book "The Roosevelt Myth", he writes that President Roosevelt knew that in order to drive Hitler out of France it would be necessary to send American armies to France and throw the power of the American navy into the war. Flynn substantiates that the president knew and believed this as early as October of 1940. The first evidence that FDR intended to go war was seen when Secretary Knox sent for Admiral J.O. Richardson, then commander-in-chief of the American Fleet in the Pacific. In January of 1941, Knox told Richardson that the President wanted him to establish a patrol of the Pacific, a wall of American Naval vessels stretched across the western Pacific in such a way as to make it impossible for Japan to prevent by force her use of any plan of the Pacific Ocean. Richardson protested vigorously. He said such action would be an act of war and that, besides, we could lose our Pacific fleet. This flagrant course of action had to be abandoned; but the President had wanted it in place as early as October 10, 1940. Obviously, the public knew nothing of these plans at the time. Three weeks after this, FDR gave his famous Boston speech in which he reiterated his promise to the American people that he would not send any of their sons overseas. In fact, earlier that year, May 7, 1940, he had made the decision to keep the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters. Admiral Richardson courageously protested this foolish decision, citing the great potential jeopardy to the Pacific Fleet. Unable to agree on this vital issue, Richardson was fired by Roosevelt early in 1941.

Richardson was replaced by the now exonerated Admiral Kimmel. On November 27, 1941, just ten days before the Pearl Harbor attack, the President told Secretary Stimson, who wrote it in his diary, that our course was to maneuver the Japanese into attacking us! On November 26, 1941, and in great secrecy, Roosevelt sent a secret, unconstitutional, inflammatory ultimatum to Japan.

*If we don't appreciate what we have, we could be miserable in paradise.*